I honestly am struggling with this, but somehow these articles are not an April Fool’s joke:
MIT Tech Review: https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/04/06/1048981/worldcoin-cryptocurrency-biometrics-web3/
Buzzfeed: https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/richardnieva/worldcoin-crypto-eyeball-scanning-orb-problems

Surreal as this may sound, there is, actually, a Crypto company, with real employees, who have built a handheld “Orb,” which they are bringing around the world, scanning the retinas of as many people they can, in exchange for vouchers for their proprietary cryptocurrency. Their actual goal is to distribute their currency equally to everyone on Earth, and they have come to the conclusion that the best way to do so is through retinal scans, to make sure no one gets their basic amount twice.

If that seems far-fetched to you, you’re not alone. The MIT article points out some very sketchy parts of their plan, and the privacy concerns involved.

The article can be found here: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60983561

“So-called “stablecoins” will become recognised forms of payment to give people confidence in using digital currencies, it said. Stablecoins are designed to have a stable value linked to traditional currencies or assets like gold. They are considered less volatile than cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin.”

Following the presentation on NFTs, this is an interesting example of another jurisdiction’s steps to regulate the risks posed by the NFTs and their potential for fraud. It’s particularly interesting that Stablecoins *have a connection to traditional currencies*. One of the points of discussion was that, by regulating blockchain technology, we lose out on the advantages (eg. Decentralization, Anonymization) of blockchain technology in the first place. However, given the unmitigated risks that we talked about, average consumers will likely be hesitant to enjoy the advantage of blockchain anyway. I agree that some form of regulation towards blockchain technology will be necessary to make them viable and safe, even if it comes at the cost of the defining traits of the technology itself.

– Uma Wu

This brief assignment will be discussing Russia’s use of disinformation as a war tactic. It will begin by outlining how disinformation has been defined, where such information is presented, and motivations for perpetuating such narratives. It will follow by discussing how the Russian government has been using strategies and narratives of disinformation, particularly since the invasion in Ukraine began. It will next review how this disinformation has been perpetuated in Russia. It will conclude by discussing what measures have been taken by online platforms to hinder the spread of Russian disinformation.

What is Disinformation?
Disinformation is false narratives spread by individuals with the intention to deceive or mislead others. Unlike misinformation, which stems from such information spreading by honest mistake, negligence, or unconscious bias, disinformation is particularly problematic because it can lead to the erosion of trust and distort public perceptions regarding matters of considerable significance. Such information can spread rapidly on a wide array of platforms that are available to everyday Internet users, such as blogs and websites, forums and message boards, and mainstream and social media sites.

Motivations for spreading disinformation can stem from ideology, money, and/or status and attention. Often, we see ideologically-driven disinformation spread to drive radicalization, with an intent of exploiting rebellion of opposing views via the Internet. Even when such information is debunked, it continues to shape people’s attitudes and beliefs. Money can be an incentive, as individuals may use media provocation as a means for financial gain, fame, and influence from people who believe and support such content. Status and attention is another factor, as individuals may use media to garner support from online communities via likes, shares, and comments.

The Spread of Disinformation by Russia
For years, Russia has been backing disinformation campaigns as a means of garnering support for their actions. The Communications Security Establishment (“CSE”) found that, since the invasion of Ukraine began, Russia has purported disinformation such as “Ukrainian authorities were harvesting organs from fallen soldiers and civilians, and that Russian troops were only attacking military targets in their “special operation” on Ukrainian soil”. Further, Putin has spread false information about Ukraine being run by “Nazis”, promoting stories saying that Russian protesters and opposers to the invasion were supporting neo-Nazis and genocide.

The US Department of State noted a few important themes of such disinformation. A notable one was that this information was meant to portray Russia as an innocent victim, alleging that its actions were retaliatory from the attacks from Western states. Particularly, they note that Russia has perpetuated narratives that the West’s reactions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine were merely because people “feared and hated Russia”. Another theme was historical revisionism, meaning that Russia has been denying or distorting historical narratives that do not align with their political objectives. This was exemplified in 2020, when Putin attempted to publish information warping the story of WWII as a means of downplaying the Soviet’s role and blaming other countries for the war. A further theme has been Russia’s creation of multiple false realities as a means of generating confusion and distraction from their role in current events. This was exemplified when, in 2018, Russia attempted to skew the story of the attempted assassination of former Russian military intelligence officer, Sergei Skripal, with Russian state-funded outlets such as Russia Today and Sputnik “spreading 138 separate and contradictory narratives via 735 articles”.

As previously discussed, the motivations of the Russian government are predominately ideologically-driven, attempting to garner support for Russia’s actions through portraying themselves as the victim of the conflict and creating false realities to manipulate the truth.

How Disinformation has been Perpetuated in Russia
Through the perpetuation of such disinformation by the Russian government, they have effectively targeted individuals to act in the interests of propagandists without realizing they have done so. Through manipulation tactics utilized on the Internet, social media, and media outlets run by amateur and professional journalists, Russia has been able to ensure that such disinformation is spread rapidly, continuously, and repetitively on high numbers of channels. Russia has utilized paid internet “trolls” to undermine information that opposes Russian themes via online chat rooms, discussion forums, and comment sections on news sites. This disinformation has been able to spread rapidly given that it does not require fact checking or verification prior to being posted, as it is merely required to favour Russia’s actions. This information is then disseminated and rebroadcasted on a variety of outlets, causing this information to be repetitively published. Paul and Matthews note that this is particularly effective given the resilience of first impressions, where individuals will be more likely to “accept first information received on a topic and then favour this information when faced with conflicting information”. This is critical given the rapid and widespread disinformation perpetuated by Russia.

Measures to Hinder Disinformation
Kari Paul notes that the response from online platforms and social media sites has fallen short of what is required to hinder the spread of disinformation. Even when measures have been made, they have been poorly and inconsistently enforced. For example, YouTube enforced measures against state-sponsored disinformation, removing more than 1,000 channels and 15,000 videos, but only after it was widely viewed and shared by users. In a study by Center for Countering Digital Hate, they examined 3,593 recent articles posted by Russia state news sources, finding that Facebook was failing to label 91% of these state-sponsored posts. Paul notes that it is difficult for such platforms to effectively hinder the spread of disinformation as long as they value engagement over truth, as there is little incentive to deter such content if it is generating considerable amounts of user-traffic.

Sources
Alex Boutilier, “Canadian Intelligence Flags Russian Disinformation Campaigns Amid Ukraine War” (2022), https://globalnews.ca/news/8727605/canadian-intelligence-flags-russian-disinformation-campaigns/

Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis, “Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online” (2017), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/DataAndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinformationOnline-1.pdf

Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, “The Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda Model” (2022), https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html

Don Fallis, “What is Disinformation?” (2015) 63 (3) John Hopkins University Press, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/579342/pdf?casa_token=sApgolP8eCEAAAAA:lSOr5urySzdRNJEJ3roEpBE2dxy21K456

Kari Paul, “’Game of Whac-a-Mole’: Why Russian Disinformation is Still Running Amok on Social Media” (2022), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2022/mar/15/russia-disinformation-social-media-ukraine

US Department of State, “Russia’s Top Five Persistent Disinformation Narratives” (2022), https://www.state.gov/russias-top-five-persistent-disinformation-narratives/

Hi everyone!

Yesterday, Lily and I posted our presentation on echo chambers and social media algorithms:

At the end of our presentation, we discuss potential means of regulation and conclude that a self-regulated framework focused on disclosure and transparency is perhaps the most effective means to deal with the negative effects of algorithmic filtering.

I came across a great article published on WIRED magazine that deals with very similar themes: ‘It’s Not Too Late for Social Media to Regulate Itself’, co-written by an academic and a member of the industry. Interestingly, the article is from 2019, suggesting that in the intermittent time, the urgency felt at the time of writing has not materialized into the development of any self-regulatory organization. This is a downside of self-regulation that we didn’t fully address in the presentation: the initial development of an effective organization requires a lot of momentum and interest, and in a diffuse industry with many stakeholders, it may be hard to translate interest into action. Just some interesting food for thought.

Some highlights from the article:
• As in our presentation, the authors recognize the benefits of personalized algorithms. However, they highlight the potential echo chamber effects and discuss the important goal of promoting public trust “in the integrity of information on search and social platforms.”
• The authors analogize a potential self-regulatory organization to the existing US Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, which is an SRO supervised by but independent of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Like the tech industry, the financial industry is highly innovative and requires nimble rulemaking to keep pace with rapid change. The authors tout the ability of SRO organizations to “bridge the gap between appropriately slow-moving governments and complex, fast-changing industries.”
• The authors note that a key benefit of self-regulation is the ability of an SRO to “balance the public interest with commercial imperatives”, which would “make a broad framework attractive to all stakeholders involved.” I thought this was a good point. Frequently, in this class and others, we look at regulation from the viewpoint of imposed restrictions – it’s interesting to think about the possibilities of setting up a regulatory system with incentives for industry participation and the potential for support from both the regulators and the regulated.

If you are interested in reading more, the full article can be found here: https://www.wired.com/story/its-not-too-late-for-social-media-to-regulate-itself/

– Jennifer Huang